NICARAGUA  CANAL 


ADDRESS 


DELIVERED  BY 

Hon.  John  F.  Miller, 


U.  S.  SENATOR, 

BEFORE  THE 

CHAMBER  OF  COMMERCE, 
BOARD  OF  TRADE,  and 
MANUFACTURERS’  ASSOCIATION, 

[ 

OF  SAN  FRANCISCO, 

June  17,  1885 


San  Francisco  :  Bosqui  Engraving  &  Printing  Co. 


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ADDRESS 

O  F 

Hon.  John  F.  Miller, 

In  the  Hall  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce, 

San  Francisco,  June  17,  1885. 


Mr.  President  and  Gentlemen : 

There  was  published  in  the  New  York  Tribune  newspaper,  about 
five  months  ago,  a  document  purporting  to  be  an  accurate  copy  of 
a  treaty  of  recent  date,  between  the  United  States  and  the  Republic 
of  Nicaragua,  relating  to  the  construction  by  the  United  States  of  a 
ship  canal  through  Nicaragua,  connecting  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
oceans.  Vigilant  as  you  gentlemen  are  known  to  be  in  all  that  con¬ 
cerns  the  commercial  and  other  important  interests  of  this  coast,  it 
may  be  assumed  that  this  publication  did  not  escape  your  attention. 
It  was  copied  in  a  greater  part  of  the  newspapers  of  the  country, 
and  the  public  mind  rests  in  the  belief  that  the  document  in  ques¬ 
tion  was  an  authentic  copy  of  a  treaty  then  reported  to  have  been 
sent  to  the  Senate  by  the  President,  and  at  that  moment  supposed 
to  be  under  consideration  by  that  body. 

Such  is  the  faith  of  the  American  people  in  the  truth  and  accu¬ 
racy  of  the  public  press!  The  rules  of  the  Senate  forbid  me,  in  this 
instance,  to  say  aught  which  shall  tend  to  disturb  that  faith,  or  to 
confirm  and  strengthen  it.  In  all  that  I  shall  say  at  this  time,  there 
shall  be  no  betrayal  of  confidence,  no  revelation  of  Senate  secret 
proceedings,  nor  transgression  of  Senate  rules.  It  is  my  purpose 
to  deal  with  historic  facts  ;  with  questions  of  public  law  ;  with  pub¬ 
lic  records,  and  with  topics  which  have  been  the  subjects  of  public 
discussion  in  and  out  of  the  Senate.  Thus  restricted,  I  propose  to 
briefly  consider  some  of  the  questions  which  have  grown  out  of  the 
proposition  for  the  construction  of  a  great  waterway  across  the 
Nicaraguan  Isthmus,  to  be  mainly  owned  and  completely  controlled 


[  2  ] 

by  the  United  States!  Whether  the  Tribune  publication  was  a  cor¬ 
rect  copy  of  a  treaty  or  a  pure  fiction,  it  was  sufficient  to  raise,  and 
did  raise  (but  not  for  the  first  time),  the  questions  as  to  the  advan¬ 
tages  and  benefits  to  be  derived  from  the  contemplated  work;  the 
responsibilities  assumed  ;  the  obstacles  in  the  way  ;  the  possible 
and  probable  international  involvements  ;  the  policy  of  an  extra¬ 
territorial  national  undertaking  of  such  proportions  ;  and  many 
other  questions  and  matters  of  fact  and  of  public  law,  having  rela¬ 
tion  to  the  subject  matter  we  are  about  to  consider. 

Upon  the  hypothesis  that  such  a  treaty  might  have  been  made, 
oV  may  be  possible  in  the  future,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  it  pro¬ 
vides,  in  direct  and  simple  terms,  for  the  construction  of  deep 
water  communication  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  shores  of 
the  two  countries  which  unite  in  the  enterprise  ;  the  one  contribut¬ 
ing  the  territory,  and  the  other  furnishing  the  money — the  actual 
management  and  control  to  remain  with  the  latter.  The  details  of 
the  proposed,  or  supposed,  arrangement  for  the  creation  of  one  of 
the  greatest  public  works  of  modern  times  are  carefully  set  out,  and 
need  no  explanation  or  elaboration  here.  Immediately  upon  the 
appearance  of  this  Tribune  treaty,  the  press  in  this  country  and 
elsewhere  entered  upon  a  general  discussion  of  its  provisions  ;  and 
the  most  prominent  question  which  engaged  the  attention  of  pub¬ 
licists  and  statesmen  was  the  international  question  suggested  by 
the  existence  of  the  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  of  1850,  known  as  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  I  propose 
to  examine  this  question  first,  for  if  it  be  true  that  considerations 
of  national  honor  and  national  safety  are  involved  ;  if  we  may  not 
proceed  in  the  canalization  of  the  Isthmus,  without  an  unjustifiable 
disregard  of  treaty  obligations  and  the  danger  of  an  indefensible 
war,  wise  statesmanship  demands  that  we  should  pause. 

There  have  been  long,  able  and  earnest  discussions  between  the 
diplomatic  representatives  of  England  and  the  United  States  upon 
the  terms,  construction  and  validity  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty, 
and  the  American  case  will  probably  never  be  better  presented 
than  it  has  been  by  Mr.  Fish,  Mr.  Blaine  and  Mr.  Frelinghuysen. 
These  statesmen  have  all  contended  that  the  treaty,  long  since 
lapsed,  became  obsolete  and  inoperative  as  a  restraint  upon  the 
United  States  in  its  assertion  of  the  right  of  control  over  inter- 
oceanic  communication  across  the  American  Isthmus,  and  I  believe 
that  their  arguments  have  never  been  successfully  answered. 

In  order  to  a  clear  comprehension  of  the  issues  upon  the  treaty 
of  1850  (Clayton-Bulwer),  it  is  requisite  to  examine  the  antecedent 
history  of  the  transaction,  as  well  as  the  attending  circumstances 
and  the  conditions  and  relations  of  the  parties  interested.  As  early 
as  1823,  the  Government  and  people  of  the  United  States  had 
manifested  a  lively  interest  in  the  political  condition  of  the  Central 
American  States,  and  in  the  canalization  of  the  Isthmus.  This  in¬ 
terest  found  expression  in  the  message  of  President  Monroe,  which 
contained  the  famous  “Monroe  Doctrine.” 

~  71  PS  ■:> 


In  1825,  Senor  Canaz,  Minister  of  the  “Republic  of  the  Center,” 
proposed  to  Mr.  Clay,  then  Secretary  of  State,  the  project  of  a  ship 
canal  through  Nicaragua,  to  be  built  by  the  United  States,  and 
owned  jointly  by  the  two  republics.  Mr.  Clay  received  the  propo¬ 
sition,  discussed  it  and  favored  it,  and  it  was  made  known  to  Con¬ 
gress  ;  but  the  poverty  of  the  nation  at  that  time  seemed  to  forbid 
the  enterprise. 

In  1830,  the  “  Dutch  Company,”  under  the  patronage  of  the 
King  of  the  Netherlands,  obtained  a  concession  from  the  Govern¬ 
ment  and  Congress  of  Central  America  for  a  canal  severing  the 
Isthmus,  to  certain  parts  of  which  objection  was  made  by  our  Gov¬ 
ernment,  although  it  contained  a  provision  that,  in  respect  to  navi¬ 
gation  and  commerce,  generally,  the  Netherlands  and  the  United 
States  were  on  an  equality.  Mr.  Livingston,  then  Secretary  of 
State,  in  instructions  of  July  20,  1831,  insisted  on  two  cardinal 
points  in  respect  of  the  concession  : 

1.  That  the  United  States  must  be  entitled  to  all  advantages 
accorded  to  other  nations. 

2.  That  if  the  grant  to  the  Dutch  Company  should  not  be  com¬ 
pleted,  he  desired  to  secure  for  the  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
or  for  the  Government  itself,  if  Congress  should  deem  the  measure 
proper  and  constitutional,  the  right  of  subscribing  for  the  stock. 

In  consequence  of  the  revolution  in  Belgium,  the  Dutch  Com¬ 
pany  failed  to  enter  upon  the  work. 

The  next  affirmative  acts  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  in  respect  of  the  proposed  canal  were  the  Canal  Resolutions, 
which  passed  the  House  and  Senate  in  March,  1835,  and  the  ap¬ 
pointment,  in  pursuance  of  them,  by  President  Jackson,  in  May, 
1835,  °f  Charles  Biddle,  to  proceed  to  Nicaragua  to  procure  infor¬ 
mation  as  to  routes,  plans,  surveys,  and  estimates  for  a  canal. 
These  resolutions  requested  the  President  to  open  negotiations 
with  the  Central  American  States  and  New  Granada,  for  “  the  pur- 
“  pose  oBeffectually  protecting,  by  suitable  treaty  stipulations,  such 
“  individuals  or  companies  as  may  undertake  to  open  communica- 
“  tion  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans,  by  the  construction 
“  of  a  ship  canal  across  the  Isthmus,  which  connects  North  and 
“  South  America.” 

In  the  year  1846,  the  United  States  again  awakened  to  the  im¬ 
portance  of  the  Isthmus  transit,  and  made  the  subsisting  treaty 
with  New  Granada,  now  the  United  States  of  Colombia,  by  which 
the  neutrality  of  the  Isthmus,  and  the  territorial  control  of  the 
State  of  Panama,  are  guaranteed  to  New  Granada,  and  under 
which  the  Panama  Railway  was  built  and  its  property  protected. 
In  1848,  when  the  United  States  was  about  to  conclude  a  treaty 
of  peace  with  Mexico,  so  great  was  the  interest  then  taken  in  the 
subject  of  Isthmian  control,  that  the  State  Department  instructed 
Mr.  Trist,  that  in  arranging  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  in  place  of  the 
$15,000,000,  which  Mexico  demanded  for  the  cession  of  New  Mexico 
and  California,  he  might  increase  the  amount  to  $30,000,000,  to 

p'SLT  1ST 


secure  the  right  of  transit  across  the  Isthmus  of  Tehauntepec. 
This  offer  was  made  by  Mr.  Trist,  and  rejected  by  Mexico  !  Thus  it 
is  seen  that,  even  prior  to  the  acquisition  from  Mexico  of  our  Pacific 
possessions,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  had  repeatedly 
recognized  the  importance  of  the  canalization  of  the  American  Isth¬ 
mus,  and  had  asserted  its  paramount  interest  in  the  Isthmian  region. 
In  truth,  the  evidences  of  the  great  solicitude  felt  on  the  subject  by 
the  ablest  and  wisest  of  our  statesmen  of  that  time  abound  in  our 
historical  records.  After  the  acquisition  of  California,  and  the  dis¬ 
covery  of  gold  on  the  Pacific  Coast,  in  1849,  the  control  of  the 
Isthmian  transit  became  a  matter  of  the  highest  importance,  and 
the  liveliest  concern  in  regard  to  it  was  manifested  by  the  Govern¬ 
ment  and  people  of  the  United  States.  It  was  then  that  Mr. 
Hise  negotiated  a  treaty  with  Nicaragua,  providing  for  the  con¬ 
struction  of  a  canal,  on  nearly  the  same  route  now  selected  by  the 
American  engineers,  and  which  gave  the  United  States  complete 
control  upon  terms  the  most  liberal  and  satisfactory.  This  saga¬ 
cious  and  highly  advantageous  treaty  arrangement  would  have 
been  hailed  with  delight  by  the  American  people  had  its  terms 
been  made  public  ;  for  it  was  confidently  expected  and  ardently 
desired  that  a  ship  canal  through  the  Isthmus  would  be  speedily 
constructed  either  by  the  United  States  or  by  an  American  com¬ 
pany  chartered  by  the  United  States,  and  under  its  patronage 
and  control.  A  company  had  been  organized,  and  had  obtained 
a  concession,  in  1849,  which  was  recognised  by  the  Hise  treaty,  and 
had  that  company  failed  to  execute  its  agreement,  other  American 
citizens  stood  ready  to  embark  in  the  great  enterprise.  And  the 
people  of  the  United  States  were  ready  to  extend  Government  aid 
to  the  work.  This  treaty  was  forwarded  to  the  Department  of 
State,  and  there  it  was  speedily  put  to  death  and  quietly  entombed. 
It  was  never  presented  to  the  Senate ! 

The  cause  of  the  suppression  of  that  treaty  was  the  fear  of  Eng¬ 
land,  and  upon  that  ignoble  terror  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was 
founded  !  That  was  the  inspiration  of  the  negotiations  which  led 
to  that  ill-advised  and  most  unfortunate  segment  of  American  di¬ 
plomacy.  To  clear  the  way  for  that  disastrous  surrender  of  the 
American  claim  of  control  over  the  Isthmus  transit,  the  Hise 
treaty  was  extinguished,  and  the  American  people  remained  ignor¬ 
ant  of  their  betrayal  and  stupendous  loss,  until  the  great  Douglas 
brought  the  timid  authors  and  counsellors  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  to  bay  in  the  open  Senate  !  England,  with  that  clear  fore¬ 
sight  which  has  distinguished  her  statesmen  and  diplomatists  dur¬ 
ing  the  greater  part  of  her  history,  and  mindful  of  the  value  and 
importance  of  the  key  to  the  Nicaraguan  transit,  uninvited  and  un¬ 
sought,  had  established  her  protectorate  over  a  handful  of  miserable 
Mosquito  Indians,  and  thereby  placed  her  seal  upon  the  eastern 
coast  of  Nicaragua,  including  the  mouth  of  the  San  Juan  river,  the 
eastern  port  and  terminus  of  the  proposed  canal  ;  and  just  six  days 
after  the  treaty  of  Guadaloupe-Hidalgo  was  signed,  by  which  we 


acquired  California,  an  English  fleet  of  war  vessels  entered  the 
harbor  of  Greytown,  and  organized  British  control  over  that 
region  !  The  title  of  the  Mosquito  claim  was  as  naked  as  the 
savages,  whose  rights  Great  Britain  assumed  to  protect.  Hitherto, 
the  sovereignty  of  the  Mosquitos  was  of  no  higher  grade  than  that 
of  the  monkeys  with  which  they  contended  for  the  wild  fruits  that 
formed  their  subsistence!  Never  was  there  invented  so  grotesque 
a  divertisement  for  the  nations  as  that  of  England’s  creation,  when 
she  enthroned  a  clouted  savage  as  king  and  sovereign,  and  mas¬ 
queraded  the  wandering,  unclad,  houseless  band  of  Mosquitos  as  a 
nation  of  Central  America,  and  gave  them  dominion  over  a  great 
river,  which  was  probably  destined  to  bear  the  ocean  commerce  of 
half  the  world  ! 

This  was  the  shadowy,  unsubstantial  and  poor  suspicion  of  title 
which  formed  the  excuse  and  claim  for  the  British  dominion  on 
the  Nicaraguan  coast,  and  it  was  this  imposture  which  frighted  the 
soul  of  the  American  Secretary  into  that  inglorious  treaty  which 
perpetuates  his  name.  Unreal,  fraudulent  and  impudent  as  was 
the  claim  of  Great  Britain  to  the  control  of  the  San  Juan  river,  by 
means  of  the  Mosquito  protectorate,  it  served  its  purpose,  and 
forced,  or  led,  this  nation  into  an  Isthmian  partnership  with  an 
European  power,  in  which  British  intervention  was  admitted,  and 
American  interests  were  engulfed  and  abandoned.  It  is  no  histori¬ 
cal  wonder  that  the  canal  was  not  built  under  the  auspices  of  this 
foolish  and  fatal  partnership.  Mr.  President,  there  has  never  been 
a  time  when  the  people  of  these  United  States  have  so  parted  with 
common  sense,  and  have  been  so  bereft  of  the  faculty  of  judgment, 
that  they  would  enter  upon  so  dismal  a  venture  as  the  construction 
of  an  interoceanic  canal  at  the  American  Isthmus  in  copartnership 
with  Great  Britain  !  The  American  people  admire  the  English, 
and  have  an  exalted  opinion  of  them,  but  they  want  no  partnership 
with  Great  Britain  in  an  American  canal  ! 

But  the  shadow  of  this  ancient  and  obsolete  partnership  treaty  is 
invoked  to  perform  in  1885  the  function  it  served  thirty-five  years 
ago — namely,  to  stop  the  United  States,  or  its  citizens,  from  con¬ 
structing  the  canal.  It  is  pretended  that  this  nation  is  still  fettered 
by  a  partnership  agreement,  the  business  of  which  neither  party 
ever  really  entered  upon  ;  a  partnership  which  was  formed  for  a  spe¬ 
cific  object,  which  was  not  attained  nor  attempted  ;  a  partnership 
agreement  which,  on  the  British  side,  was  never  thought  of  except 
to  break  its  covenants  ;  a  partnership  long  since  dissolved  by  the 
defeat  and  failure  of  its  purpose,  in  consequence  of  the  acts  of  one 
of  the  parties  ;  a  partnership  made  obsolete  by  the  march  of  great 
events  and  the  changes  of  national  fortunes!  Upon  the  face  of  the 
treaty,  the  object  and  purpose  of  it  was  to  cause  the  speedy  con¬ 
struction  of  a  canal  through  Nicaragua  ;  and  it  was  declared  by  the 
treaty  that  the  specific  object  of  both  nations  was  to  promote  the 
scheme  for  a  canal,  at  that  time  in  process  of  organization,  under 
an  existing  concession  from  the  government  of  Nicaragua.  To  that 


end  Great  Britain  promised  and  agreed  that  the  impediment  which 
she  had  intentionally  raised  by  means  of  the  Mosquito  protectorate 
should  be  immediately  removed  ;  that  the  Mosquito  claim  was 
to  be  at  once  abandoned,  and  the  mouth  of  the  San  Juan  river 
left  free  under  the  undisputed  sovereignty  of  Nicaragua.  The  im¬ 
mediate  extinguishment  of  this  pretended  claim  was  one  of  the 
principal  or  moving  considerations  for  Mr.  Clayton’s  abandonment 
of  the  Hise  treaty,  and  all  its  benefits  and  advantages,  and  the 
acceptance,  in  its  stead,  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  Great  Britain 
industriously,  continuously  and  conspicuously  violated  the  letter 
and  spirit  of  the  treaty  in  the  matter  of  the  Mosquito  protectorate, 
beginning  with  the  day  of  its  date  and  continuing  for  ten  years. 
That  protectorate  was  maintained  until  her  treaty  with  Nicaragua, 
which  was  made  on  the  28th  day  of  January,  i860.  It  was  stipulated 
in  the  last  mentioned  treaty  that  “  the  British  protectorate  of  that 
“  part  of  the  Mosquito  territory  (claimed  by  the  Mosquito  Indians 
“  within  the  frontier  of  the  Republic  of  Nicaragua)  shall  cease  three 
“  months  after  the  exchange  of  the  ratification  of  the  present  treaty.” 
The  specific  clause  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  which  England 
violated  is  the  first  article,  wherein  she  agreed  not  to  “  assume  or 
“  exercise  any  dominion  over  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  the  Mosquito 
“  coast,  or  any  part  of  Central  America,”  from  and  after  its  date.  For 
more  than  ten  years  after  that  engagement  Great  Britain  maintained 
the  Mosquito  protectorate,  thus  holding  in  her  grasp  the  mouth  of 
the  San  Juan  ;  our  Government  constantly  urging  her  to  relinquish 
her  hold  and  to  extinguish  the  Mosquito  claim,  as  she  had  promised 
to  do.  This  the  diplomatic  correspondence  between  the  two  gov¬ 
ernments  shows,  and  in  April,  1852,  an  arrangement  was  agreed 
upon  between  Mr.  Webster  and  Mr.  Crampton,  the  British  Minister, 
by  which  the  Mosquito  difficulty  was  to  be  immediately  settled,  by 
the  cession  to  Nicaragua  of  all  the  Mosquito  claim  south  of  1 1°  34' 
north  latitude,  “  including  Greytown.”  This  was  to  uncover  the 
eastern  terminus  of  the  canal,  and  thus  enable  the  company  propos¬ 
ing  the  construction  to  proceed,  but  Great  Britain  delayed  the  exe¬ 
cution  of  this  arrangement  for  eight  years ;  and  the  American 
company  could  not  safely  proceed,  nor  obtain  capital,  while  the  pro¬ 
tectorate  lasted.  In  June,  1852,  Mr.  Lawrence,  then  United  States 
Minister  at  London,  wrote  to  Mr.  Webster  concerning  theCrampton- 
Webster  arrangement,  as  follows  :  “  With  respect  to  the  construc- 
“  tion  of  the  canal,  I  have  often  expressed  my  anxious  desire  that 
“  all  questions  touching  the  Mosquito  Indians,  and  the  disputes 
“  between  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica,  should  be  definitely  settled, 
“  in  order  that  the  canal  company  might  be  orga?iized  and  the  zvork 
“  commenced .” 

The  maintenance  of  the  Mosquito  protectorate  was,  therefore,  a 
wilful  and  inexcusable  violation  of  the  treaty,  and  it  was  unques¬ 
tionably  the  primary,  if  not  the  sole  cause,  of  the  failure  of  the  ca¬ 
nal  company,  to  perform  its  contract  with  Nicaragua  for  the  con¬ 
struction  of  the  canal.  Mr.  Lawrence  writes,  in  1852,  that  money 


could  be  had  for  building  the  canal,  if  the  Mosquito  difficulty  was 
settled,  and  had  Great  Britain  kept  faith,  it  is  fair  to  presume  that 
the  stock  would  have  been  eagerly  taken  and  the  canal  an  accom¬ 
plished  fact. 

But  this  is  not  the  only  infraction  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 
by  Great  Britain,  which  is  a  justification  of  the  United  States  in  re¬ 
garding  it  as  a  broken  compact,  and  as  no  longer  binding  upon 
her.  At  the  time  the  treaty  was  made,  1850,  there  was  a  settle¬ 
ment  of  British  subjects  on  the  Belize,  under  an  ancient  grant  from 
Spain,  for  the  sole  purpose  of  cutting  logwood  and  mahogony  ; 
which  settlement  had  remained  under  Spanish  sovereignty,  while 
Spain  maintained  her  power,  and,  after  the  independence  of  the 
Central  American  States,  under  their  sovereignty.  A  small  British 
settlement  had  also  been  made  on  the  Bay  Islands,  in  the  Bay  of 
Honduras,  which  was  under  the  sovereignty  of  Honduras  at  the  time 
the  treaty  was  made. 

In  direct  and  palpable  violation  of  the  first  article  of  the  Clay¬ 
ton-Bulwer  treaty,  the  British  government,  on  the  17th  day  of  July, 
1852,  proclaimed  the  organization  of  the  Bay  Islands  into  a  British 
colony  !  These  are  the  words  of  the  proclamation: 

“  This  is  to  give  notice  that  Her  Most  Gracious  Majesty,  the 
“  Queen,  has  been  pleased  to  constitute  and  make  the  Islands 
“  of  Roatan,  Bonacco,  Utilla,  Barbarat,  Helene  and  Morat,  to  be  a 
“  colony,  to  be  known  and  designated  as  the  Colony  of  the  Bay 
“  Islands.”  Thus,  within  a  little  more  than  two  years  after  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  signed,  Great  Britain  did  the  very  thing 
it  was  stipulated  by  the  treaty  she  should  not  do,  and  maintained 
her  dominion  over  the  Bay  Islands  until,  under  fear  of  a  perma¬ 
nent  breach  of  friendly  relations  with  the  United  States,  she,  by 
treaty  with  Honduras,  ceded  back  the  sovereignty  of  the  Islands  to 
that  Republic  in  1859.  But  this  is  not  all.  The  “  settlement  ”  on 
the  Belize  was  promoted  and  encouraged,  and  expanded  by  Eng¬ 
land  from  a  mere  settlement  in  1850,  under  the  sovereignty  of  Gua¬ 
temala,  within  definite  boundaries,  and  for  the  specific  purpose  of 
cutting  wood,  into  an  organized  British  colony,  and  is  so  maintained 
to  this  day,  under  the  dominion  and  government  of  Great  Britain, 
with  boundaries  extended  to  cover  an  area  nearly  as  large  as  half  of 
New  England.  In  order  to  curb  the  expansive  tendency  of  this 
colony,  and  to  save  her  territory  from  being  entirely  overrun  by  the 
English,  Guatemala  entered  into  a  treaty  with  Great  Britain,  in 
April,  1859,  for  the  settlement  of  the  boundary  of  “  British  Hon¬ 
duras,”  as  the  colony  was  called,  and  an  unsuccessful  attempt  was 
made  to  fix  the  boundaries.  Thus,  Great  Britain,  in  1859,  created 
another  colony  from  the  settlement  on  the  Belize,  and  its  existence  is 
a  continuous  violation  of  the  treaty.  Now,  it  is  urged  that  the 
United  States  is  estopped  from  pleading  these  several  wanton,  in¬ 
tentional,  and  flagrant  breaches  of  the  treaty  of  1850,  on  the  part 
of  England,  because  President  Buchanan,  in  his  Message  to  Con¬ 
gress  in  i860,  said  that  the  questions  arising  from  the  Clayton- 


Bulvver  treaty,  had  by  the  three  treaties  between  England  and 
Nicaragua,  Honduras  and  Guatemala,  “resulted  in  a  final  settle- 
“  ment,  entirely  satisfactory  to  this  Government !  ”  In  respect  to 
this  contention,  I  have  to  observe,  first,  that  Mr.  Buchanan  had  ref¬ 
erence  more  particularly  to  the  Mosquito  dispute  in  his  expression 
of  satisfaction  ;  and  it  was  not  addressed  to  Great  Britain,  but  to 
Congress  ;  and  it  was  not  intended  as  a  condonation  of  England’s 
offences,  but  was  a  mere  idle  boast  of  an  achievement  of  his  admin¬ 
istration,  and  second,  that  Mr.  Buchanan  was  not,  at  any  time,  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  !  This  is,  I  believe,  the  first  at¬ 
tempt  ever  made  in  this  country  to  exalt  a  President’s  message 
into  the  dignity  of  a  treaty,  or  of  public  law !  Mr.  Buchanan  had 
no  more  authority  as  President  of  the  United  States,  without  action 
of  Congress,  to  condone  a  violation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 
than  he  had  the  power,  of  himself,  to  make  war  on  England,  and 
this  the  British  Government  perfectly  understood.  The  language 
used  in  his  message  was  no  more  than  the  expression  of  the  opin¬ 
ion  of  James  Buchanan,  and  about  that  time  Mr.  Buchanan  held 
many  opinions,  upon  a  wide  range  of  subjects,  which  the  people  of 
the  United  States  did  not  endorse,  and  this  was  one  of  them. 
These  violations  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  by  England  have 
never  been  condoned,  nor  excused,  nor  acquiesced  in,  nor  forgiven, 
nor  forgotten  by  the  Government  or  people  of  the  United  States.  For 
many  years  after  Mr.  Buchanan’s  generous  exclamation  of  satisfaction 
with  the  course  of  Great  Britain  in  Central  America,  the  United 
States  was  busied  in  matters  of  domestic  concern  of  supreme  im¬ 
portance,  some  of  which  had  resulted  from  the  weak  and  yielding 
disposition  of  this  same  James  Buchanan,  and  the  nation  was  not 
taking  much  note  of  Central  American  affairs  just  then,  and  neither 
adopted  nor  disavowed  Mr.  Buchanan’s  opinion  thus  expressed,  but 
it  has  been  emphatically  disavowed  since. 

But  is  there  any  reason,  in  honor  or  justice,  why  the  United  States 
should  alone  be  bound  in  perpetuity  by  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 
when  every  consideration  for  entering  into  has  failed,  and  its 
prime  object  has  been  defeated  ?  Even  though  there  had  been  no 
violation  of  it,  the  changed  conditions  of  the  parties,  the  lapse  of 
time,  the  failure  of  the  object  for  which  it  was  made,  the  marvellous 
growth  of  commerce,  the  changes  in  the  lines  of  transportation, 
the  wonderful  development  of  the  Pacific  States,  and  the  general 
progress  of  the  Western  nations  afford  abundant  reason  for  the 
attitude  of  the  United  States  in  giving  notice  to  Great  Britain,  as  has 
been  done,  that  the  United  States  will  assume  her  rightful  place 
among  the  nations  of  this  hemisphere,  and  refuse  to  be  bound  by 
these  rusty  manacles,  which,  in  an  evil  hour,  were  forged  for  her 
restraint. 

The  language  of  Mr.  Blaine,  addressed  to  Lord  Granville  in 
November,  1 88 1 ,  appears  to  express  the  American  view  of  this 
subject  with  great  clearness  and  force.  Speaking  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  he  says  :  “  This  convention  was  made  more  than 


“  thirty  years  ago,  under  exceptional  and  extraordinary  conditions 
“  which  have  long  since  ceased  to  exist — conditions  which  at  best 
“  were  temporary  in  their  nature,  and  which  can  never  be  repro- 
“  duced.  The  remarkable  development  of  the  United  States  on 
“  the  Pacific  Coast  since  that  time  has  created  new  duties  fofc  this 
“  Government,  and  devolved  new  responsibilities  upon  it.”  Fur¬ 
ther  on  he  says  of  the  treaty : 

“  Its  provisions  embody  a  misconception  of  the  relative  positions 
“  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  with  respect  to  the  inter- 
“  ests  of  each  government  in  questions  pertaining  to  this  continent. 
“  The  Government  of  the  United  States  has  no  occasion  to  disavow 
“  an  aggressive  disposition.  Its  entire  policy  establishes  a  pacific 
“  character,  and  among  its  chief  aims  is  to  cultivate  the  most 
“  friendly  and  intimate  relations  with  its  neighbors,  both  indepen- 
“  dent  and  colonial.  At  the  same  time,  this  Government,  with  re- 
“  spect  to  European  States,  will  not  consent  to  perpetuate  any 
“  treaty  that  impeaches  our  right  and  long-established  claim  to 
“  priority  on  the  American  continent. 

“The  United  States  seeks  only  to  use  for  the  defense  of  its  own 
“  interests  the  same  forecast  and  prevision  which  Her  Majesty’s 
“  Government  so  emphatically  employs  in  defense  of  the  interests 
“  of  the  British  empire.  To  guard  her  Eastern  possessions,  to  se- 
“  cure  the  most  rapid  transit  for  troops  and  munitions  of  war,  and 
“  to  prevent  any  other  nation  having  equal  facilities  in  the  same 
“  direction,  Great  Britain  holds  and  fortifies  all  the  strategic  points 
“  that  control  the  route  to  India.  At  Gibraltar,  at  Malta,  at  Cyprus, 
“  her  fortifications  gives  her  the  mastery  of  the  Mediterranean.  She 
“  holds  a  controlling  interest  in  the  Suez  Canal,  and  by  her  fortifi- 
“  cations  at  Aden  and  on  the  Island  of  Perim,  she  excludes  all 
“  other  powers  from  the  waters  of  the  Red  Sea,  and  renders  it  a 
“  mare  clmiswn.  It  would,  in  the  judgment  of  the  President,  be 
“  no  more  unreasonable  for  the  United  States  to  demand  a  share 
“  in  these  fortifications,  or  to  demand  their  absolute  neutralization, 
“  than  for  England  to  make  the  same  demand  in  perpetuity  from 
“  the  United  States  with  respect  to  the  transit  across  the  American 
“  continent.  The  possessions  which  Great  Britain  thus  carefully 
“  guards  in  the  East  are  not  of  more  importance  to  her  than  is  the 
“  Pacific  slope,  with  its  present  development  and  assured  growth, 
“  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States. 

“  The  States  and  Territories  appurtenant  to  the  Pacific  ocean  and 
“  dependent  upon  it  for  commercial  outlet,  and  hence  directly  inter- 
“  ested  in  the  canal,  comprise  an  area  of  nearly  eight  hundred  thou- 
“  sand  square  miles,  larger  in  extent  than  the  German  empire  and 
u  the  four  Latin  countries  of  Europe  combined. 

“  This  vast  region  is  but  fairly  beginning  its  prosperous  develop- 
“  ment.  In  the  near  future  the  money  value  of  its  surplus  for  export 
“  will  be  as  large  as  that  of  British  India,  and  perhaps  larger.  Nor 
“  must  it  be  forgotten  that  India  is  but  a  distant  colony  of  Great 
‘  Britain,  while  the  region  on  the  Pacific  is  an  integral  portion  of  our 


[  IO  ] 


“  national  Union,  and  is  of  the  very  form  and  body  of  our  state. 
“  The  inhabitants  of  India  are  alien  from  England  in  race,  language 
“  and  religion.  The  citizens  of  California,  Oregon  and  Nevada,  with 
“  the  adjacent  Territories,  are  of  our  own  blood  and  kindred — bone 
of  our  bone  and  flesh  of  our  flesh. 

"  Great  Britain  appreciates  the  advantage,  and  perhaps  the  neces- 
“  sity,  of  maintaining,  at  the  cost  of  large  military  and  naval  estab- 
“  lishments,  the  interior  and  nearest  route  to  India,  while  any  nation 
“  with  hostile  intent  is  compelled  to  take  the  longer  route,  and  travel 
“  many  thousand  additional  miles  through  dangerous  seas.  It  is 
“  hardly  conceivable  that  the  same  great  power,  which  considers  her- 
“  self  justified  in  taking  these  precautions  for  the  safety  of  a  remote 
“  colony  on  another  continent,  should  object  to  the  United  States 
“  adopting  similar,  but  far  less  demonstrative  measures  for  the  pro- 
“  tection  of  the  distant  shores  of  her  own  domain,  for  the  drawing 
“  together  of  the  extremes  of  the  Union  in  still  closer  bonds  of 
“  interest  and  sympathy,  and  for  holding,  in  the  quiet  determination 
“  of  an  honorable  self-defense,  the  absolute  control  of  the  great 
“  waterway  which  shall  unite  the  two  oceans,  and  which  the  United 
“  States  will  always  insist  upon  treating  as  part  of  her  coast  line. 

“  If  a  hostile  movement  should  at  any  time  be  made  against  the 
“  Pacific  coast,  threatening  danger  to  its  people  and  destruction 
“  to  its  property,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  would  feel 
“  that  it  had  been  unfaithful  to  its  duty  and  neglectful  towards  its 
“  own  citizens,  if  it  permitted  itself  to  be  bound  by  a  treaty  which 
“  gave  the  same  right  through  the  canal  to  a  war-ship  bent  on  an 
“  errand  of  destruction  that  is  reserved  to  its  own  navy,  sailing  for 
“  the  defense  of  our  coast  and  the  protection  of  the  lives  of  our 
“  people.  And  as  England  insists,  by  the  might  of  her  power,  that 
“  her  enemies  in  war  shall  strike  her  Indian  possessions  only  by 
“  doubling  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  so  the  Government  of  the 
“  United  States  will  equally  insist  that  the  interior,  more  speedy, 
“  and  safer  route  of  the  canal  shall  be  reserved  for  ourselves,  while 
“  our  enemies,  if  we  shall  ever  be  so  unfortunate  as  to  have  any, 
“  shall  be  remanded  to  the  voyage  around  Cape  Horn. 

“  A  consideration  of  controlling  influence  in  this  question  is  the 
“  well-settled  conviction  on  the  part  of  this  Government,  that  only 
“  by  the  United  States  exercising  supervision  can  the  Isthmus 
“  canals  be  definitely  and  at  all  times  secured  against  the  in- 
“  terference  and  obstruction  incident  to  war.  A  mere  agreement 
“  of  neutrality  on  paper  between  the  great  powers  of  Europe  might 
“  prove  ineffectual  to  preserve  the  canal  in  time  of  hostilities.  The 
“  first  sound  of  a  cannon  in  a  general  European  war  would,  in  all 
“  probability,  annul  the  treaty  of  neutrality,  and  the  strategic  posi- 
“  tion  of  the  canal,  commanding  both  oceans,  might  be  held  by  the 
“  first  naval  power  that  could  seize  it.  If  this  should  be  done,  the 
“  United  States  would  suffer  such  grave  inconvenience  and  loss  in 
“  her  domestic  commerce  as  would  enforce  the  duty  of  a  defensive 
“  and  protective  war  on  her  pare,  for  the  mere  purpose  of  gaining 


t  II  ] 


“  that  control  which,  in  advance,  she  insists  is  due  to  her  position 
“  and  demanded  by  her  necessities. 

*  *  *  *  *  *  * 

“  For  self-protection  to  her  own  interests,  therefore,  the  United 
“  States,  in  the  first  instance,  asserts  her  right  to  control  the  Isth 
“  mus  transit.  And,  secondly,  she  offers  by  such  control  that  abso- 
“  lute  neutralization  of  the  canal  as  respects  European  powers 
“  which  can  in  no  other  way  be  certainly  attained  and  lastingly 
“  assured.” 

Great  Britain  was  here  distinctly  informed  that  the  conditions 
under  which  the  United  States  entered  into  this  treaty  were  extra¬ 
ordinary  and  exceptional,  and  that  these  had  passed  away  and  new 
conditions,  imposing  new  duties  and  responsibilities  upon  this  nation, 
had  developed,  and  that  the  United  States  would  not  be  bound 
longer  by  the  provisions  of  a  treaty  which  “  impeaches  our  right 
“  and  long-established  claim  to  priority  on  the  American  continent,” 
and  that  for  “self-protection  to  her  own  interests,  the  United  States 
“  asserts  her  right  to  control  the  Isthmus  transit.”  This  notice  is 
accompanied  by  reasons  for  giving  it,  and  a  similar  and  no  less 
positive  assertion  of  the  same  position  is  made  by  Mr.Frelinghuysen 
subsequently,  in  his  correspondence  with  Lord  Granville,  accom¬ 
panied  by  arguments  so  clear  and  convincing  that  no  unprejudiced 
mind  can  fail  to  admit  them  as  conclusive!  All  writers  on  inter¬ 
national  law  apply  this  maxim,  in  substance,  to  treaties :  “When  that 
“  state  of  things  which  was  essential  to  and  the  moving  cause  of 
“  the  promise  or  engagement  has  undergone  a  material  change,  or 
“  has  ceased,  the  foundation  of  the  promise  or  engagement  is  gone 
“  and  their  obligation  has  ceased.” 

The  motive  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  being,  as  is  shown  by 
its  terms,  to  encourage  the  immediate  building  of  a  canal  by  a  com¬ 
pany  then  in  existence  and  proposing  to  build  it,  or  by  private  per¬ 
sons  who  should  take  the  place  of  that  company  ;  and,  owing  to 
causes  which  have  been  explained,  neither  the  company  nor  any 
private  persons  have  been  able  to  even  begin  the  construction; 
and  thirty-five  years  having  passed;  the  object  of  the  treaty  hav¬ 
ing  failed,  and  the  conditions  of  the  parties  having  undergone  the 
most  marvelous  changes,  the  contention  that  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  can  be  set  up  as  a  bar  against  the  construction  of  this  great 
work  seems  to  be  against  reason.  The  obligations  of  the  treaty  in 
respect  to  the  canal  have  lapsed,  because  there  is  no  canal — no  ob¬ 
ject  to  which  they  can  be  said  to  relate  or  apply.  The  treaty  has 
been  a  dead  letter!  Nothing  has  been  done  in  execution  of  its 
stipulations.  Certainly  not  by  England  ;  for  she  has  performed  no 
act  in  relation  to  it,  except  to  violate  it.  With  the  movement  of 
of  time  there  have  come  to  this  country  such  changes,  not  only  in 
respect  of  its  internal  development,  but  in  its  relations  to  other  na¬ 
tions,  that  it  is  no  longer  prudent  or  possible  for  its  Government 
to  wait  in  hope  of  a  consummation  of  the  object  and  purpose  of 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  by  the  method  contemplated  by  it. 


In  no  like  period  of  the  world’s  history  has  such  stupendous 
changes  been  wrought  in  the  conditions  of  peoples  and  States  as 
have  taken  place  in  the  thirty-five  years  since  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
arrangement  was  made !  There  has  never  been  greater  progress 
made  by  mankind  in  the  same  space  of  time.  A  great  waterway 
has  been  constructed  through  the  drifting  sands  of  the  Isthmus  of 
Suez,  which  has  changed  the  conditions  of  trade,  and  the  transpor¬ 
tation  routes  of  the  Eastern  hemisphere.  England,  by  her  peculiar 
method  of  dealing  with  nations,  has  come  in  possession  of  that 
waterway,  and  this  has  enabled  her  to  make  conquest  of  all  worth 
having  in  the  East,  and  given  her  perpetual  control  of  India  and 
commercial  supremacy  in  a  greater  part  of  the  Orient.  If  she  had 
control  of  a  waterway  through  the  Darien  Isthmus,  she  would  be 
not  only  “  mistress  of  the  seas,”  but  the  empress  of  the  commercial 
world  !  The  changes  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic  have  been  the 
marvel  of  mankind.  The  United  States  has,  in  thirty-five  years, 
developed  and  expanded  from  a  commonwealth  of  twenty-three 
millions  to  a  nation  of  fifty-six  millions  of  people,  possessing  every 
element  of  a  progressive  civilization,  and  all  the  qualities  which 
give  a  people  power  and  consequence  among  the  nations.  Our 
Pacific  States  and  Territories,  which  in  1850  were  almost  unex¬ 
plored,  have  developed  into  an  empire,  with  opulent  cities  and  a 
magnificent  domain,  capable  of  sustaining  a  population  equal  to 
that  of  the  United  States  at  the  date  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  ! 
Since  then  there  have  been  added  to  our  Union  nearly  six  hundred 
thousand  square  miles  of  territory  on  the  North  Pacific.  In  1850, 
our  total  annual  revenues  were  $47,000,000.  Now  they  are 
$400,000,000 !  The  nation  was  not  then  financially  able  to  build 
the  canal  alone.  Now  it  can  do  it  without  aid  from  any  quarter. 
Since  then  we  have  opened  the  doors  of  many  Oriental  marts  to 
American  commerce  !  We  have  become  one  of  the  first  manufac¬ 
turing  nations,  and  our  internal  commerce  exceeds  that  of  any 
people  on  the  earth  !  We  have  built  railways,  whose  tracks  would 
four  times  encircle  the  globe  !  These  are  some  of  the  changes 
which  have  created  new  conditions  and  relations,  and  have  super¬ 
seded  those  of  thirty-five  years  ago.  And  to  these  should  be  added 
the  courageous  attempt  of  the  French  at  Panama,  which  threatens 
to  bring  into  existence  and  prominence  new  and  totally  different 
conditions  and  relations  from  those  now  existing,  and  which  will 
impose  other  and  different  duties  and  responsibilities  upon  the 
United  States  than  any  dreamed  of_in  1850,  or  perhaps  much 
thought  of  now ! 

The  United  States  has  need  of  a  canal  of  her  own  for  the  uses 
of  her  own  commerce,  and  for  her  own  defence  :  for  the  French 
canal  at  Panama  is  a  menace  to  the  interests  and  safety  of  our 
Pacific  possessions,  and  our  commerce  upon  the  sea.  In  1850,  the 
people  of  California  were  importing  breadstuffs  from  Chile.  They 
exported  nothing  but  gold.  Now  the  Pacific  Coast  can  export  a 
million  and  a  half  tons  of  wheat  annually,  and  many  thousands  of 


[  13  ] 


tons  of  other  products!  The  commerce  of  the  United  States 
which  would  pass  through  the  canal  if  built,  both  coastwise  and 
foreign,  would,  at  the  same  tolls  charged  on  the  Suez  canal,  pay 
four  per  cent,  annual  dividend  on  one  hundred  million  dollars ! 
This  commerce  is  the  result  of  development,  which  has  taken  place 
almost  entirely  since  1850.  Shall  it  be  said  that  an  arrangement 
with  Great  Britain,  made  with  reference  to  the  conditions  of  1850, 
and  for  a  specific  purpose  which  has  failed,  shall  be  held  to  restrain 
this  nation  from  providing  a  route  of  transportation  for  her  great 
and  growing  commerce  ?  Since  the  French  have  occupied  the 
Panama  transit,  there  is  no  other  route  but  that  through  Nicaragua. 
Shall  we  be  shut  out  from  the  Isthmus,  and  our  Pacific  coast  and 
cities,  and  our  merchant  marine  left  at  the  mercy  of  European 
fleets  ?  Our  commercial  interests,  no  less  than  the  common  de¬ 
fence,  demand  that  we  have  a  waterway  through  Nicaragua,  and  no 
ancient,  improvident,  obsolete  and  lapsed  agreement  with  Great 
Britain  can  be  invoked  to  prevent  its  construction  ! 

It  may  not  be  wholly  useless  to  inquire  how  far,  and  in  what  par¬ 
ticular,  the  making  of  such  a  treaty  as  that  printed  in  the  Tribune , 
is  violative  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  Let  us  see  what  it  was 
that  the  two  nations  engaged  to  do  by  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty. 

1.  To  protect  any  parties  having  authority  of  the  local  govern¬ 
ment  through  which  the  canal  may  pass,  their  employes  and  prop¬ 
erty  engaged  and  used  in  the  construction  of  the  canal,  from  unjust 
detention,  confiscation,  seizure  or  violence. 

2.  To  use  their  influence  with  such  local  governments  to  facili¬ 
tate  the  construction  of  the  canal,  and  the  establishment  of  two 
free  ports,  one  at  each  end  of  the  same. 

3.  To  protect  the  canal,  when  completed,  from  interruption, 
seizure  or  confiscation,  and  to  guarantee  the  neutrality  thereof,  so 
that  it  shall  remain  Ppen  and  free,  and  the  capital  invested  therein 
secure,  conditionally ,  upon  the  company  managing  it  without  dis¬ 
crimination  or  unjust  charges,  either  party  being  at  liberty  to  with¬ 
draw  its  protection  by  giving  six  months’  notice. 

4.  To  invite  friendly  States  to  enter  into  like  stipulations,  with 
the  right  of  each  of  the  two  contracting  parties  to  enter  into  treaty 

9  stipulations  with  any  Central  American  State  to  facilitate  the  con¬ 
struction  and  protection  of  the  canal  for  the  benefit  of  mankind,  etc. 

5.  To  give  support  and  encouragement  to  the  company  first 
offering  to  build  the  canal,  and  give  to  the  company  which  has  a 
contract  with  Nicaragua  the  preference  for  one  year. 

6.  To  extend  their  protection  by  treaty  stipulations  to  railway 
or  canal  communication  across  the  Isthmus  by  way  of  Tehauntepec 
or  Panama. 

These  are  all  the  affirmative  obligations,  and  they  relate,  so  far 
as  Nicaragua  is  concerned,  to  a  canal  to  be  built  by  private  persons, 
or  a'  company,  and  have  especial  reference  to  the  company  which 
then  held  a  concession.  No  reference  is  made  to  any  canal  to  be 
built  by  either  of  the  Governments,  or  by  both  jointly. 


[  H  ] 


What  are  the  things  the  two  Governments  agree  not  to  do  ? 

1.  They  declare  that  neither  the  one  or  the  other  will  ever  ob¬ 
tain  or  maintain  for  itself  any  exclusive  control  over  the  said  ship 
canal. 

2.  They  agree  that  neither  will  ever  erect  or  maintain  any  for¬ 
tification  commanding  the  canal,  or  in  the  vicinity  thereof. 

3.  Nor  occupy,  nor  fortify,  nor  colonize,  nor  assume,  nor  exer¬ 
cise,  any  dominion  over  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  the  Mosquito  Coast, 
or  any  part  of  Central  America. 

4.  Nor  will  either  make  any  use  of  any  protection  which  either 
may  afford,  or  any  alliance  which  either  may  have  to  or  with  any 
State,  for  the  purpose  of  erecting  any  such  fortifications,  or  of  col¬ 
onizing,  etc. 

Nor  either  take  any  advantage  of  any  intimacy,  or  use  any  alli¬ 
ance,  connection,  or  influence  with  any  State  through  which  the 
canal  may  pass,  for  the  purchase  of,  or  holding  for  the  citizens  or 
subjects  of  one  any  rights  or  advantages,  in  regard  to  commerce  or 
navigation  through  the  said  canal,  which  shall  not  be  offered  on  the 
same  terms  to  the  citizens  or  subjects  of  the  other. 

These  are  the  renunciatory  clauses,  or  stipulations  of  restraint, 
and  they  are  dependent  upon  the  affirmative  stipulations,  and  have 
relation  to  the  same  object.  If  the  affirmative  stipulations  have 
lapsed  for  want  of  an  object,  to  which  they  could  be  made  to  apply, 
then  these  renunciatory  clauses  have  ceased  to  be  obligatory.  It 
will  be  observed  that  the  first  of  these  clauses  is  but  a  declaration 
of  intention.  “  The  Governments  of  the  United  States  and  Great 
“  Britain  hereby  declare  that  neither  the  one  or  the  other  will  ever 
“  obtain  or  maintain  for  itself  any  control  over  the  said  ship  canal.” 
Does  any  one  suppose  that  this  declaration  would  have  deterred 
Great  Britain  from  purchasing  a  majority  of  the  stock  of  that  canal 
company  if  the  canal  had  been  built  ?  If  an  emergency  had  arisen 
similar  to  that  in  the  case  of  the  Suez  Canal,  how  long  would  it 
have  taken  England  to  have  changed  her  mind  and  intention  ?  We 
would  have  been  told  that  renunciatory  clauses  in  treaties  are  not 
of  perpetual  operation,  and  that  they  fall  with  important  changes 
of  conditions.  Taking  this  first  declaration  with  other  parts  of  the 
treaty,  it  means  that  these  two  governments  intend  to  guarantee 
that  the  canal  about  to  be  built  by  a  private  corporation,  with  its 
own  money,  shall  remain  under  the  control  of  that  corporation,  and 
under  the  sovereignty  of  Nicaragua,  and  that  England  and  the 
United  States  will  guarantee  that  Nicaragua  shall  protect  the 
Company  in  its  rights  of  property  and  control  ;  but  this  guarantee 
and  protection  to  be  withdrawn,  if  the  corporation  shall  make  un¬ 
fair  discriminations  as  to  the  commerce  of  one  of  the  parties  over 
the  commerce  of  the  other,  or  shall  impose  oppressive  tolls,  etc. 
That  this  arrangement  had  direct  reference  to  a  canal  then  to  be 
built  by  private  parties,  and  had  no  reference  to  any  canal  which 
might  in  the  future  be  built  and  owned  by  either  of  the  parties  to 
the  treaty,  is  evident,  and  the  declaration  (or  agreement,  if  it  can 


[  i5  ] 


be  so  called),  that  neither  would  obtain  exclusive  control  was  never 
intended  to  apply  to  a  government  canal  undertaken  by  either  of 
the  nations  thirty-five  years  afterwards. 

If  England  had  obtained  a  concession  from  Nicaragua,  and 
began  the  construction  of  a  canal  in  priority  of  the  United  States, 
after  a  lapse  of  a  third  of  a  century,  the  private  parties  having 
failed  to  build  as  contemplated,  could  the  United  States  have 
claimed,  under  the  treaty,  a  right  to  be  admitted  to  a  joint  control  ? 
It  is  probable  that  our  Government  would  have  sought  to  apply  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  such  a  case,  but  if  the  concession  were  such 
an  one  as  is  contained  in  the  Tribune  publication,  by  which  the 
canal  is  free  to  all  nations,  and  remains  under  the  sovereignty  of 
Nicaragua,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  United  States  could  have 
made  objection  upon  any  other  ground  than  that  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  And  should  the  United  States  cease  to  pursue  the  pur¬ 
pose  of  building  a  canal,  and  Great  Britain  should  take  a  conces¬ 
sion  which  we  refuse,  and  construct  the  canal,  it  is  difficult  to  per¬ 
ceive  any  ground  of  objection  whatever,  which  the  United  States 
could  reasonably  make.  Can  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  be  said  to 
possess  the  quality  of  immortality  ?  Is  it  a  never-ending,  inextin¬ 
guishable  compact  which  one  of  the  parties  may  forever  hold  up  as 
a  scroll  of  fate,  forbidding  the  progress  of  nations  ? 

The  other  negative  agreements  in  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  pre¬ 
sent  no  points  of  conflict  with  the  Tribune  treaty.  The  United 
States  does  not,  by  that  document,  propose  to  fortify  the  canal,  nor 
occupy,  or  fortify,  or  colonize,  or  assume,  or  exercise  any  dominion 
over  Nicaragua,  nor  do  any  other  thing  forbidden  by  the  first 
article  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  Admitting  that  treaty  to  be 
a  valid  and  existing  agreement,  (for  the  sake  of  argument,)  before 
England  can,  with  reason  make  any  objection  to  such  an  arrange¬ 
ment  with  Nicaragua,  she  must  ask  to  be  admitted  to  a  participa¬ 
tion  in  the  undertaking,  and  offer  to  furnish  her  quota  of  the  money, 
and  to  assume  a  share  of  the  obligations  and  responsibilities  of  the 
venture.  Until  she  is  refused  all  this,  it  does  not  seem  to  me  that 
she  has  ground  for  complaint,  for  even  though  we  expand  the 
meaning  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  so  as  to  include  any  canal 
which  may  be  at  any  time  built,  it  is  specifically  agreed  in  Article 
VI  as  follows  :  “  And  the  contracting  parties  likewise  agree,  that 
“  each  shall  (may?)  enter  into  treaty  stipulations  with  such  of  the 
“  Central  American  States  as  they  may  deem  advisable ,  for  the pur- 
“  pose  of  more  effectually  carrying  out  the  great  design  of  this  conven- 
“  tion,  namely,  that  of  constructing  and  maintaining  the  said  canal 
“  as  a  ship  communication  between  the  two  oceans, the  benefit 
“  of  mankind ,  on  equal  terms  to  all,  and  of  protecting  the  same.” 
This  is  precisely  what  the  United  States  would  have  done,  had  the 
Tribune  treaty  been  made,  and  as  no  one  else  proposes  to  build  the 
canal,  it  is  proposed  that  the  United  States  build  it!  Here  seems 
to  be  sufficient  warrant  for  making  such  a  treaty  with  Nicaragua  ; 
at  least,  the  making  of  such  a  treaty  is  no  violation  of  the  Clayton- 


Bulwer  treaty.  At  all  events,  it  will  be  time  enough  to  regard 
Great  Britain’s  complaints  or  protests,  when  they  are  received,  and 
to  consider  the  question  of  the  admission  of  Great  Britain  to  a  co¬ 
partnership  with  the  United  States  in  an  American  canal ,  when  the 
proposition  is  definitely  made! 

My  apology  for  so  long  a  discussion  of  the  international  ques¬ 
tions  involved  is,  that  I  know  that  there  are  some  who  hesitate  to 
give  such  a  measure  their  support,  because  they  fear  that  there  is 
here  a  contravention  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  which  involves 
questions  of  national  honor  and  good  faith,  and  the  consequent 
danger  of  war.  No  more  important  considerations  can  occupy  the 
attention  of  the  people.  It  does  not  seem  to  me,  however,  that 
any  of  our  existing  engagements  with  Great  Britain  are  violated  by 
the  proposed  arrangement  with  Nicaragua  for  the  canal,  nor  should 
there  be  any  fear  of  war  with  England.  There  will  be  no  questions 
or  misunderstandings  growing  out  of  such  an  arrangement  which 
will  not  be  susceptible  of  honorable  settlement  by  negotiations  be¬ 
tween  the  two  Governments,  and  I  regard  it  as  doubtful  whether 
Great  Britain  will  interpose  any  objection  to  our  going  forward 
with  the  great  work,  which  will  promote  her  interests  as  well  as 
ours,  and  benefit  mankind.  Certainly  she  has  no  right  to  object. 

That  the  route  selected  by  the  American  engineers  is  the  best 
and  most  economical,  for  uniting  the  two  great  oceans  by  a  com¬ 
mercial  and  military  waterway,  is  abundantly  shown,  by  the  reports 
of  Isthmus  explorations  and  surveys,  in  the  possession  of  the  Gov¬ 
ernment.  Nearly  three-fourths  of  the  distance  of  this  waterway  is 
by  natural  channels,  which  require  but  a  small  outlay  to  render 
them  practicable  for  the  largest  vessels  afloat.  The  magnificent 
lake  which  nature  has  provided  in  the  heart  of  Nicaragua,  for  an 
international  haven  and  harbor  of  refuge,  is  so  ample  and  deep  and 
placid,  that  the  argosies  of  all  the  seas  may  rest  in  peace  and  safety 
upon  its  bosom,  when  once  channels  are  opened  from  its  east  and 
west  shores  to  the  two  great  oceans  !  Upon  its  islands  there  may 
be  stored  supplies  for  all  the  naval  and  merchant  ships  which  may 
pass^from  ocean  to  ocean  ;  and  upon  these  islands,  or  upon  the 
shore  of  the  lake,  may  also  be  erected  shops  and  docks  for  every 
kind  of  repairs.  All  engineers  and  experts  in  nautical  science  pro¬ 
nounce  the  proposed  canal  practicable,  although  they  differ  in  their 
estimates  of  the  cost.  The  estimate  of  the  engineers  of  the  Mara- 
time  Canal  Company,  Mr.  Menocal  and  others,  was  $41,000,000, 
including  improvements  to  harbors  at  each  end  of  the  canal.  To 
this  should  be  added  fifty  per  cent,  for  engineering  contingencies, 
and  twenty  per  cent,  for  other  possible  contingencies,  making  the 
probable  cost  about  $70,000,000.  I  am  aware  that  other  engineers 
have  estimated  the  cost  much  higher,  and  it  is  difficult  to  make 
even  a  close  approximate  estimate  of  the  cost  of  so  vast  a  work. 
There  are  numerous  examples,  however,  of  like  works,  which  in 
some  degree  serve  as  guides  in  making  estimates  for  contingencies. 
After  an  examination  of  the  several  plans  and  estimates,  it  would 


seem  that  the  maximum  estimate  cannot  exceed  double  the 
amount  of  the  estimate  of  Mr.  Menocal,  which  would  give  $82,- 
000,000  as  the  ultimate  cost.  The  Suez  canal,  100  miles  long,  cost 
$92,000,000,  including  the  construction  of  the  harbor  at  Port  Said, 
and  docks  for  all  sorts  of  repairs,  and  it  is  stated  by  engineers  of 
high  reputation,  that  the  Suez  canal  could  now  be  built  for  half  the 
sum  it  cost. 

It  is  confidently  asserted  by  the  officers  of  the  United  States, 
who  have  made  the  surveys  of  the  line  of  the  proposed  canal,  that 
there  are  no  considerable  engineering  difficulties  to  be  expected. 
The  restoration  or  creation  of  the  harbor  at  the  Eastern  terminus 
does  not  appear  to  be  problematical,  and  is  much  easier  of  accom¬ 
plishment  than  the  creation  of  the  harbor  of  Port  Said.  Some  en¬ 
gineers  have  estimated  the  cost  of  reclaiming  the  harbor  at  Grey- 
town  at  five  million  dollars,  while  the  plan  of  Admiral  Ammen, 
Capt.  Phelps,  and  others,  does  not  involve  more  than  half  that  sum. 
The  engineer  officers  regard  it  as  an  easy  matter  to  construct 
works  at  Brito,  on  the  Pacific,  which  will  ensure  a  good  harbor  at  a 
maximum  cost  not  exceeding  $2,500,000.  The  deepest  cut  on  the 
line  is  41  feet,  and  the  highest  embankment  required  is  but  five  feet. 
The  lake  area  is  2,700  square  miles,  with  a  drainage  basin  of  8,000 
square  miles,  and  the  lake  being  the  summit  level  of  the  canal,  fur¬ 
nishes  an  inexhaustible  supply  of  fresh  water  throughout  the  year 
for  canal  purposes.  It  is  possible  that  the  forty-three  miles  of 
canalization,  with  the  two  harbors,  the  necessary  works  for  slack 
water  in  the  San  Juan  river;  the  thirteen  locks;  the  necessary 
machinery,  buildings,  appliances,  and  everything  necessary  for  the 
construction  and  for  operating  the  canal,  may  aggregate  a  cost  of 
$100,000,000,  as  estimated  by  the  Humphreys  Board  ;  but  it  is  be¬ 
lieved  that  under  no  contingency  will  the  work  cost  more  than  that 
amount ;  an  immense  sum,  it  is  true,  but  while  the  cost  is  great,  the 
benefits  and  advantages  are  almost  inconceivably  great.  In  a 
mere  economic  view,  the  enterprise  is  most  desirable,  whether  the 
Panama  canal  be  finished  or  not.  The  tonnage  which  will  neces¬ 
sarily  take  the  route  of  this  canal  in  preference  to  that  of  Panama, 
could  not  fail  to  reach  2,500,000  tons  annually,  which  would  pay,  at 
moderate  tolls,  a  clear  profit  of  four  per  cent,  per  annum  on  $100,- 
000,000,  the  first  five  years,  with  a  constant  increase  afterward.  A 
statement  of  the  saving  in  sailing  distances  will  serve  to  indicate 
the  volume  of  commerce  which  must  pass  the  canal  :  From  New 
York  to  Hong  Kong,  5,870  miles  ;  from  New  York  to  Yokohama, 
6,800  miles  ;  from  New  York  to  San  Francisco,  8,600  miles  ;  from 
San  Francisco  to  Fiverpool,  6,100  miles. 

The  saving  in  freights  alone  upon  the  transportation  of  Pacific 
coast  exports  to  European  and  American  Atlantic  ports,  at  a  fair 
average  estimate,  would  not  be  less  than  $9,000,000  per  annum  ; 
and  with  the  progress  of  development  in  this  region,  the  saving 
would  be  increased  probably  not  less  than  ten  per  cent,  per  annum, 
or  $1,000,000  per  annum.  In  this  calculation  I  have  omitted  the 


[  18  1 


immense  saving  in  freights,  upon  merchandise  shipped  from  the 
Atlantic  ports  to  the  Pacific  ports.  This  canal  would  open  a  new, 
cheap  emigration  route  to  the  Pacific  coast,  and  this  region,  so  de¬ 
sirable  for  settlement,  would  speedily  increase  in  population  and  in 
its  production,  thus  creating  constantly  new  business  for  the  canal  ; 
and  instead  of  injuring  the  transcontinental  lines  of  railway,  their 
business  would  be  increased  in  volume  by  the  rapid  and  steady  de¬ 
velopment  of  the  country  through  which  they  pass.  The  Suez 
canal,  which  the  wise  men  said  would  never  pay,  furnishes  an  in¬ 
structive  example  as  to  the  ratio  of  increase  in  the  business  of  such 
a  canal. 


In  1870  net  tonnage  passed 
“  1871  “ 

“  1872  “ 

“  1873  “ 

“  1874  “ 

“  1875  “ 


,  436,609  tons;  receipts,  $1,031,865 
761,467  “  “  1,798.746 

1,160,748  “  “  3,281,518 

1,367,767  “  “  4,579,465 

1,631,650  “  “  4,971,476 

2,009,984  “  “  5,777,260 


This  illustrates  the  ratio  of  increase  for  the  first  six  years.  In 
the  next  five  years  the  increase  was  not  so  rapid  ;  but  in  1880  it 
had  reached  :  Tonnage  passed,  3,057,421  tons;  receipts,  $8,364,179. 
And  in  1883,  the  tonnage  passed  was  5,775,861  tons  ;  receipts,  $13,- 

762,413- 

In  1884  the  business  was  about  the  same  as  in  1883,  for  which 
the  stockholders  received  eighteen  per  cent,  dividend  on  their  in¬ 
vestment.  The  tolls  have  been  reduced  to  $1.93  per  ton,  and  the 
pilot  dues  have  been  abolished. 

While  the  American  canal  will  start  with  a  much  larger  business 
than  that  of  the  Suez  canal  in  1870,  perhaps  five  times  as  great,  it 
will  probably  increase  in  a  like  ratio,  to  the  ratio  of  increase  shown 
by  the  figures  I  have  quoted.  There  need  be  no  fear  of  the  Pana¬ 
ma  canal.  Within  ten  years  there  will  be  business  for  both  canals, 
leaving  for  Eads’  Tehauntepec  Railway  all  the  ships  it  will  ever  be 
able  to  safely  carry. 

But;  Mr.  President,  it  is  unnecessary  tq  detain  this  assembly  with 
descriptions  of  the  canal,  or  the  technology  of  its  construction,  or 
with  speculations  in  regard  to  rival  enterprises.  The  reports  of  the 
officers  who  have  made  the  surveys  are  voluminous  and  accessible, 
and  are  sufficiently  thorough  and  instructive  to  give  all  necessary 
information  concerning  the  enterprise.  That  it  is  practicable,  and 
will  prove  to  be  of  great  utility  and  value,  there  can  be  no  doubt. 
Why  then  should  not  the  United  States  go  forward  to  the  accom¬ 
plishment  of  a  work  so  grand  in  its  design,  so  necessary  to  the  in¬ 
dustrial  and  commercial  interests  of  the  country,  and  which  prom¬ 
ises  results  so  beneficial  to  many  millions  of  our  race  ?  Is  it  not 
time  for  this  great  nation  to  peacefully  assert  its  power,  and  utilize 
its  influence  among  the  nations  of  the  West  ?  Is  it  not  time  that 
we  should  look  out  upon  the  world  and  contemplate  the  possibili¬ 
ties  of  new  commercial  relations  ?  Is  it  not  prudent  to  secure  con- 


» 


trol  of  an  agency,  which,  in  the  possession  of  a  great  European 
power,  would  be  used  to  our  detriment  not  only  in  times  of  peace, 
but  which  might  be  utilized  to  the  great  injury  of  our  Pacific  coast, 
and  our  general  commerce  in  time  of  war  ?  A  strong  naval  power 
in  possession  of  the  lake  of  Nicaragua  and  its  islands,  with  a  ship 
canal  connecting  its  waters  with  the  two  oceans,  would  hold  the 
commerce  of  this  hemisphere  at  its  mercy.  Once  in  possession  of 
that  line  of  transportation,  no  single  power,  nor  the  allied  powers 
of  half  the  world  could  dislodge  her,  and  there  in  the  security  of 
that  interior  sea  she  would  concentrate  her  fleets  of  war  ships  and 
the  material  of  war,  and  be  able  to  send  forth  her  commerce  de¬ 
stroyers  to  swarm  upon  either  ocean,  and  her  iron-clads  to  devastate 
the  towns  and  cities  of  either  coast  There  is  no  such  strategic 
position  for  naval  operations  in  all  the  world  !  Why  not  occupy  it 
ourselves?  If  we  give  it  up,  another  will  take  it,  and  then  the  chain 
of  our  environment  will  be  complete!  If  constitutional  objections 
to  this  great  undertaking  are  raised,  it  may  be  answered,  that  it  is 
a  specific  constitutional  power  and  duty  of  Congress  to  provide  for 
the  national  defence,  and  to  promote  the  general  welfare. 

The  question  of  securing  markets  for  American  manufactures  is 
one  which  is  being  pressed  upon  the  attention  of  those  who  have 
to  deal  with  such  questions,  with  constantly  increasing  force.  Pro¬ 
duction  has  been  so  stimulated  in  this  country,  that  the  home  mar¬ 
ket  is  overfilled,  and  to-day,  we  have  the  plant,  machinery,  capital, 
workmen  and  facilities  for  manufacturing  the  leading  articles  of 
manufacture,  sufficient  for  the  wants  of  at  least  eighty,  perhaps  one 
hundred  millions  of  people,  and  we  have  fifty-six  millions  to  sup¬ 
ply  !  The  extension  of  our  commerce  into  new  fields,  and  among 
other  peoples,  has  become  a  necessity  of  our  industrial  system. 
Whatever,  therefore,  promotes  the  discovery  or  creation  of  new  and 
additional  markets  for  our  manufactures,  is  a  national  blessing. 
The  proposed  canal  will  open  new  fields  to  American  enterprise, 
and  by  shortening  transportation  routes,  the  American  people  will 
be  able  to  successfully  contend  for  the  trade  of  many  millions  of 
people,  whose  profitable  commerce  is  now  enjoyed  by  England  and 
European  nations,  because  of  the  shorter  lines  of  transportation 
open  to  them.  The  merchant  marine  of  the  United  States  will  be 
revived  and  restored,  and  life  and  activity  will  be  visible  in  the 
shipyards,  which  are  now  deserted  and  desolate.  By  the  control 
of  this  canal,  the  foreign  commerce  of  this  country,  created  and 
fostered  by  it,  will  be  conducted  by  Americans,  and  carried  by 
American  vessels.  By  means  of  this  canal,  we  shall  be  brought 
into  closer  commercial  relations  with  all  Central  America,  and  the 
Pacific  States  of  South  America,  and  ultimately  we  shall  control 
the  commerce  of  those  States.  Our  metropolitan  cities  will  be¬ 
come  the  centers  of  the  financial  systems  of  the  peoples  of  this 
hemisphere,  with  whom  our  people  trade.  American  ideas  and 
American  methods  will  be  gradually  adopted,  and  American  civili¬ 
zation  will  spread  and  vivify  like  the  sunshine  throughout  those 


/ 


[  20  ] 

regions,  and  the  consequent  development  will  create  new  wants, 
which  our  people  will  supply  to  the  benefit  of  the  nation  !  This 
great  work  will  unlock  the  gate  which  bars  our  way  to  the  com¬ 
merce  of  the  Orient,  and  it  will  give  the  key  to  American  mer¬ 
chants  !  Our  Eastern  commercial  centers  will  have  the  shorter  line 
to  China  and  Japan,  and  the  Islands  of  the  Pacific,  as  compared 
with  European  lines  of  transportation.  ^ 

The  advantages  and  benefits  which  the  control  of  this  canal  will 
bring  to  this  coast  and  the  whole  United  States  are  incalculable. 

Its  construction  will  be  an  achievement  worthy  of  the  first  nation  + 
of  the  earth  !  It  will  be  an  illustration  of  the  power,  the  nerve  and 
sagacity  of  the  American  people,  which  will  challenge  the  respect 
of  all  mankind.  It  will  be  an  object  lesson  to  the  nations  of 
Europe,  teaching  the  American  method  of  dealing  with  great 
affairs,  and  illustrating  in  a  practical  way  the  future  policy  of  this 
Government  in  respect  to  the  nations  and  peoples  of  this  hemi¬ 
sphere  !  It  will  mark  a  new  era  in  the  life  of  this  nation.  The 
consummation  of  this  work  will  be  a  triumph  of  peace,  no  less 
renowned  than  our  greatest  victories  in  war !  Sir,  this  is  the  na¬ 
tion’s  opportunity,  and  the  turning  point  in  the  destiny  of  the 
Pacific  States.  This  is  the  age  of  prodigious  enterprises  and  great 
utilities.  It  is  the  age  of  action  !  The  day  of  the  manifesto  has 
passed.  National  greatness  is  measured  by  national  performance! 

This  nation  has  taught  the  Western  nations  the  lesson  of  progress 
by  example  !  Why  should  we  halt  or  hesitate  now  ?  Shall  we 
ask  consent  of  Great  Britain,  before  we  proceed  to  the  execution  of 
this  great  design  ?  Or  shall  we  go  forward  without  fear,  with  firm 
and  steady  step  in  the  grand  march  of  progress  toward  the  fulfill¬ 
ment  of  American  destiny  ! 


